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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
rather than for the payment of money. The court did not realize that any
such construction must result in rendering the instruments non-negotiable
for they do not then possess the essential attribute of being payable in money.
In reading this opinion it must be remembered that it was rendered by the
same court which was soon to hold the Legal Tender Act unconstitutional as
applied to prior existing contracts. Hepburn v. Griswold (1870) 8 Wallace
603. This decision was overruled in the Legal Tender Cases (1871) 12 Wall.
457. Since Juilliard v. Greenman (1884) 11 U. S. 421, the power of the
United States even in times of peace to issue legal tender paper money cannot
be doubted.
In the instant case the New York court distinguishes Bronson v. Rodes by
pointing out that it applied to a situation in which two types of money were
legally in circulation, while this is now no longer true. The Court chiefly re-
lied on the very recent English case of In Re Societies Intercommunale Belge
d'Electricite-Fiest v. The Company (Ch. Div. 1932) 174 Law Times 367,
aff'd (Ct. of App. 1933) 148 Times Law Reports 344. This is unfortunate.
In the first place the gold clause in that case was so badly drawn that the
courts could and did construe it not to require payment in gold as a mere mat-
ter of construction of the language used. Secondly, the English Parliament
is not hampered by any constitutional restrictions on its powers.
Under the law as it existed at the time the principal case was decided, it
would seem that the New York Court could have obtained very nearly the
same result by treating this as a case where performance of the terms of a con-
tract was made impossible by subsequent legislation, giving the obligee a mere
right to damages. Restatement of the Law of Contracts sec. 458. This right
to damages would be valueless, since there was no legal use to which the gold
might be put by which it would command more than the stipulated parity in
paper money.
Congress has recently regularized this situation by passing a joint resolu-
tion specifically providing that paper money may be tendered in payment of
all public and private debts whether or not they are so worded as to require
payment in gold alone. However much one may quarrel with the economic
wisdom or ethical morality of such a policy of national repudiation of con-
tract rights, its legality would seem clear. The clause forbidding the impair-
ment of the obligation of contracts only restricts state action. The due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment cannot restrict Congress in the rea-
sonable exercise of its powers granted by the Constitution. G. W. S., '33.
INTERNAL REvENUE-INcomE TAX-LIFE INSURANCE TRUSTS.-The settlor
took out several policies of life insurance in favor of trustees. These trus-
tees were to hold the proceeds of the policies for named beneficiaries. At the
same time the settlor transferred certain securities to the trustees which they
were to use as far as necessary to pay the premiums on the insurance policies
and to distribute, in their discretion, any surplus to the beneficiaries of the
policies. The trusts were irrevocable and no part of the proceeds of the
policies could become part of the estate of the settlor. The settlor had waived
all his rights to change the beneficiary of the policy. Subsequent to the
creation of these trusts Congress enacted a statute which purported to re-
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quire the settlor of such trusts to include in his taxable income the income
which actually was collected by the trustees. Revenue Act of 1924 sec. 219
(h) ; Revenue Act of 1926 sec. 219 (h) (a substantially similar provision is
contained in the Revenue Act of 1932 sec. 167). The taxpayer contended
that such a statute as applied to an irrevocable trust under which the tax-
payer could receive no financial benefit was contrary to due process of law as
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Held: Congress may validly impose
such a tax. Wells v. Burnett (1933) 53 S. Ct. 528.
The opinion for the majority of the Court was written by Justice Cardezo.
It frankly admits that in matters of taxation the technicalities of legal title
are not to be regarded. This declaration is familiar law. It has recently
been applied in the cases allowing the inclusion in the income of the settlor
of the income of a trust in which the settlor has a power of revocation either
alone or in conjunction with some one who is not a beneficiary. Corliss 'V.
Bowers (1930) 281 U. S. 376; Reinecke v. Smith (1933) 53 S. Ct. 570 (where
the trust was created prior to the passage of the statute imposing the tax).
Justice Cardozo considers that the statute was a justified attempt to prevent
evasion of taxes. This was doubtless its purpose, as is shown by the report
of the Senate committee in favor of its adoption. The opinion stresses the
fact that the settlor could sue on the policy if the insurance company failed
to carry out its terms, and calls it a "social duty" of the head of the family to
take insurance for the benefit of his immediate family (forgetting that one of
the beneficiaries of the trust was not so close a relation).
Justices Sutherland, Van Deventer, McReynolds and Butler dissented on
the ground that the creation of the trust amounted to a completed gift, strip-
ping the donor of all right in the property or the income from it and that it
had been held that it was contrary to due process to impose a tax en the donor
of a gift when the gift had been made prior to the passage of the statute.
Nichols v. Coolidge (1927) 274 U. S. 518; Blodgett v. Holden (1927) 275 U. S.
142; Untermeyer v. Anderson (1928) 276 U. S. 440; cf. Burnett v. Guggen-
heim (1933) 288 U. S. 280 (holding that the gift took place when a power of
revocation was waived rather than when the original deed was executed).
The Supreme Court has allowed the inclusion in the income of the taxpayer
of sums which he actually received but by private contract was bound to
divide after receipt with his wife. Lucas v. Earl (1930) 281 U. S. 111; Bur-
nett v. Leininger (1932) 285 U. S. 136. But these cases may be distinguished
from the principal case in that in the principal case the taxpayer never did
receive any legal or equitable title to the meney.
The reliance upon the doctrine of evasion of taxes is questionable. It
would result in forcing the donor to pay income taxes on the future income
of all gifts he might make to his family, for doubtless one motive in making
these is often to reduce the income tax that the donor must pay when he is
accustomed to spend the income for the benefit of the donee. Yet, the Su-
preme Court has recently invalidated a Wisconsin statute which attempted to
force the husband to include in his taxable income sums paid to the wife, who
would not then have to pay any tax upon her income. Hoeper V. Tax Com-
mission (1931) 284 U. S. 206. Certainly the relationship between husband
and wife is the closest relationship known to the law. It has been recognized
that the due process clause restricts attempts to prevent evasion of taxes.
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Heiner v. Donnan (1932) 285 U. S. 312 (holding invalid the conclusive pre-
sumption that all gifts made within two years before death were made in con-
templation of death and hence that the property involved should be included in
the estate of the decedent for the purposes of the Federal Estate Tax).
The court's views concerning the desirability of life insurance will no doubt
please the salesman of life insurance but it would seem strange that they
should determine fundamental principles of constitutional law. The reliance
upon the power of the insured to sue on the policy seems to be a mere use of
a legal technicality which the court has just said does not control in matters
of taxation. In any event it could be obviated in all future cases by having
some other person who has an insurable interest in the settlor's life take out
the policy. Cf. Vance on Insurance (2nd ed. 1930) 147-164.
However much we may quarrel with the decision in the principal case,
there can be little doubt of the correctness of the decision of the court in the
companion case of Du Pont v. Burnett (1933) 53 S. Ct. 528. This involved the
same statutory clause but in creating the trusts the settlor had reserved a
right of revocation and hence the case could have been decided on the same
basis as Corliss v. Bowers and Reinecke v. Smith, above (the four justices
who dissented in the Wells case concurred specially in the Du Pont case).
It is to be hoped that the decision in the principal case will either be over-
ruled or limited to its precise facts. It would seem that the logical conclusion
for the decision is to allow the taxation to one person of income actually re-
ceived by another in all cases in which Congress may think this necessary to
prevent evasion no matter how little legal or economic title the taxpayer may
have in the income involved. G. W. S., '33.
CONTACTs--DEAMINGS IN FUTURES-GAMBLING.-A broker took orders in
Missouri to buy and sell grain on the Chicago and Minneapolis exchanges,
and now sues for balance due. On the District Court's findings that, although
defendant's orders were executed on these exchanges, they were merely cloaks
for gambling between plaintiff and defendant, no actual deliveries being in-
tended, held, the transactions between plaintiff and defendant were wholly
executed in Missouri and hence governed by R. S. Mo. (1929) sees. 4316-4323
and void; also that the Federal Grain Futures Act (7 U. S. C. Ch. 1) although
in addition to, does not supersede state statutes directed against dealing in
grain futures. Justices Butler, Stone and Cardozo agree with the latter but
dissent from the former ruling. Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co. (1932) 53
S. Ct. 362.
Although supported by authorities elsewhere it is difficult to reconcile the
first part of the majority opinion with the main channel of Missouri law in
accordance with which it purports to decide. Even apart from Missouri
rulings brokerage contracts usually are governed by the law of the place where
the orders are executed. Samson Bros. & Co. v. Turner (1921) 277 F. 680;
Wilhite v. Houston (1912) 200 F. 390. There are cases contra. Bartlett V.
Collins (1901) 109 Wis. 477, 85 N. W. 703; and Burrus v. Witcover (1912)
158 N. C. 384, 74 S. E. 11, decided on basis that comity need not extend to a
contract against the public policy of the state in which it is sought to be en-
forced. In Missouri, however, a strong line of decisions enforces the law of
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